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Lipshaw: Lexical Opportunism and the Limits of Contract Theory

LEXICAL OPPORTUNISM AND THE LIMITS OF
CONTRACT THEORY*
Jeffrey M Lipshaw
Abstract
This essay is a reflection on the gap between the reallife practice of contract law and some of the academic
theory that tries to explain it. I describe "lexical
opportunism," an aspect of contract practice having
three elements. First, the parties must have reduced
a complex business arrangement to contractualtext,
portions of which text are as devoid of thoughtful
drafting or close negotiation as the boilerplate in a
consumer contract. Second, an adversary cleverly
develops a legal theory based upon a colorable
interpretationof that text. Third, this interpretation
creates a potential for staggeringliability beyond all
common sense. A multi-billion lawsuit, recently
settled, serves as an example, and triggers my
discussion of (a) what it means to engage in
theoretical assessment in contract law; (b) how the
justification of contract law by way of inhibiting
economic opportunism is based on the simplest
examples, rather than the kind of contract discourse
found in any real-world contract worth spending
millions to litigate; and (c) how normative theory
based on upholding the moral sanctity of promise
keeping evaporates when the parties disagree about
the meaning of their promises. I argue that both
economic and moral theories about contract law fail
to account for issues in the use of language and
depend on the naive adoption of the correspondence
theory of truth. The nature of language permits
opportunism, and the only check on it is the desire,
* Or, Why Litigation Over a Failed Merger with $7 Billion Turning on Interpretation of Twenty-One

Words of BoilerplateAffirms My Skepticism About Economic and Moral Theories of ContractLaw.
** Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. A.B., University of Michigan, 1975; J.D.
Stanford University, 1979. 1 am grateful to Dennis Patterson, Rob Kar, Pat Shin, Victor Goldberg, Jeff
Harrison, and participants at the 10th International Contracts Conference at the William S. Boyd School
of Law at UNLV for helpful comments.
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from whatever motivation, not to be opportunistic. I
conclude with what I hope are some constructive
thoughts about the appropriate use of theory in
lawyering, and thereby mitigate my skepticism
whether any single theory or discipline is capable of
meaningful explanation or prediction about lexical
opportunism.
'We should be pragmatic about theory It is a tool,
rather than a glimpse of ultimate truth, and the
criterion of a tool is its utility '4
I. INTRODUCTION
This is a reflection on the gap between the real-life practice of
contract law and the academic theory that tries to explain it. As
someone who used to do mergers and acquisitions as a lawyer and
corporate executive, I occasionally get a call to comment on pending
litigation. I also happen to be an academic theorist who has written
about contract theory, and a teacher who guides first-year law students
through the standard fare of casebook law. These interludes in which I
leave the ivory tower and revisit contract disputes in the real world
cause me to shake my head sadly, as they generally confirm my intuition
that trying to connect before-the-fact contracting intentions and
behaviors with colorable after-the-fact interpretation disputes misses the
point.
My skepticism about academic theories of contract law most recently
flared up in connection with an eight-year-old dispute, the result of a
contested public company takeover, between Johnson & Johnson, the
frustrated suitor, and medical device maker Guidant Corporation, now a
subsidiary of the winning bidder, Boston Scientific Corporation. The
contract issues are straightforward despite having arisen out of the
documentation of a deal worth more than $20 billion. I will tell the
story of the case and explain the context of relatively standard M&A
contract practice. Then I will reflect on the implications of the case for
1. Richard A. Posner, The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics, J. INST. &
THEORET. ECON. 73, 77 (1993).
2. The case culminated in a bench trial before Judge Richard J. Sullivan of United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York in late November 2014. The parties submitted
their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on January 16, 2015. The record reflects that the
parties settled and the case was dismissed with prejudice on March 30, 2015. United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, Civil Docket for Case No. 1:06-cv-07685-RJS,
https:/ecf'nysd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/ DktRpt.pl?108224015220512-L_1_0-1. See also Press Release,
Boston Scientific, Boston Scientific Announces Agreement With Johnson & Johnson to Resolve
Guidant Litigation (Feb. 17, 2015), http://news.bostonscientific.com/2015-02-17-Boston-Scientific-
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the prevailing economic and moral theories justifying state intervention
in the enforcement of private agreements, at least when we put aside the

abstractions and get down to cases.
With the disclaimer that I had no stake in the outcome of the case and

no particular sympathy for Boston Scientific's uncomfortable situation,
digging into J&J's claim caused me to have flashbacks to my most
frustrating experiences as a general counsel: contending with a
phenomenon I am here calling "lexical opportunism," an aspect of

contract practice having three elements.

First, the parties must have

reduced a complex business arrangement to contractual text, portions of
which text are as devoid of thoughtful drafting or close negotiation as
the boilerplate in a consumer contract. Second, an adversary cleverly
develops a legal theory based upon a colorable interpretation of that

text. Third, this interpretation creates a potential for staggering liability
beyond all common sense. 3
I have long harbored two bugaboos about contract theory, at least

when thinking about the complex deals I did versus the "Dick and
Jane" 4 contracts that are the necessary fodder for broad theory. The first
is the fantasy that contract law actually does much to limit opportunism

except in the arid laboratories where law professors conduct their
thought-experiments.

The second is the illusion of mutual consent

against which to measure the putative opportunism or the moral force of
the promise as a rational process in either contract formation or
interpretation. 5 Most business agreements worth litigating over were, at
Announces-Agreement-With-Johnson-Johnson-To-Resolve-Guidant-Litigation.
None of that matters to
me because the mere fact that this litigation occurred, rather than how it might have concluded, is what
interests me.
3. It is a fair question whether I ever authorized the very kind of lexically opportunistic
lawsuits I am criticizing here. When I was representing a client as advocate in a contract claim, I did the
best I could with the language I had, but I always thought that being credible was important. As the
chief lawyer for several businesses, I heeded the teaching of one of my mentors to the effect that once
you get around to litigating a contract case, it doesn't matter who the plaintiff or defendant is;
there's
only a "****er" and a "****ee" and your job as a lawyer is to make sure it's clear your client is the
latter and the other side is the former. In other words, I will simply say that I put the burden on anyone
trying to make a lawyer's case for us also to demonstrate that we would be able to show we were the
",****ee."1
4. I am indebted to Victor Goldberg for the phrase "Dick and Jane" contracts.
5. My particular b~e noire on this topic is the contract law professoriate's fascination with
Raffles v. Wichelhaus (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375. Raffles was the famous case in which the parties
referred in the contract to a ship named Peerless traveling from India to Liverpool. Amazingly, there
were two ships named Peerless, one departing Bombay in October and the other in December. The
parties claimed to have been referring subjectively to the different ships. The court held no contract to
have been formed. What I find astounding is that we have not been able to find another more modem
case in 150 years. I do not teach it anymore, because it strikes me as the casebook equivalent of basing
an entire unit of a medical school anatomy course on Joseph Merrick, also known as the "Elephant
Man." Mirror Online referred to Merrick as "the best known 'human curiosity' in history," and that is
how I feel about the good ships Peerless. Bodyshocked: Elephant Man Joseph Merrick and other
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the time of their creation, a complex synergy of individual intentions
and motivations, more or less complete communications, drafting
practices, pressures, and deadlines, many of which propelled the
contract to its execution as a thing, a deed, or an event, and not
necessarily as a logical and coherent text. In contrast, merely focusing
after-the-fact on the logic and coherence of the text is, as often as not, an
economist's simplification, a moralist's ideal, or a lawyer's delusion.
My purpose here is to use the dispute between J&J and Boston
Scientific as a case study in lexical opportunism. In Part II, I describe
the interpretation issue that led to litigation with as much as $7 billion in
damages and interest at stake. In Part III, I discuss (a) what it means to
engage in theoretical assessments and justifications of social institutions
like contract law; (b) how the justification of contract law by way of
inhibiting economic opportunism is based on the simplest of "Dick and
Jane" examples, rather than the kind of contract discourse found in any
real-world contract worth spending millions to litigate; and (c) how
normative theory based on upholding the moral sanctity of promise
keeping evaporates when the parties disagree about the meaning of their
promises. In Part IV, I take account of a recent study by Mitu Gulati
and Robert Scott of a particular instance, like the contract provision at
issue in Johnson & Johnson v. Guidant, of a surprising mismatch
between the deal and the contract, and argue that both economic and
moral theories about contract law (a) fail to take account of the nature of
the very language in which any contract of any complexity is drafted,
and (b) depend on the naive adoption of the correspondence theory of
truth. The nature of language permits opportunism, and the only check
on it is the desire, from whatever motivation, not to be opportunistic. I
conclude with what I hope are some constructive thoughts about the
appropriate use of theory in lawyering, and thereby mitigate my
skepticism whether any single theory or discipline is capable of
meaningful explanation or prediction about lexical opportunism.
II.

THE CASE AND ITS CONTEXT 6

Guidant Corporation (Guidant) manufactured and sold sophisticated
medical devices. In 2005, it agreed to be merged into Johnson &
Johnson (J&J) under a contract that would pay the shareholders of
'vintage circus freaks', MIRROR.CO.UK (Aug. 4, 2012), http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/josephmerrick-150th-birthday-pics- 1217647.
6. Detailed statements of the facts are available in Judge Lynch's opinion and order on motions
to dismiss in 2007, Johnson & Johnson v. Guidant Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), and
Judge Sullivan's opinion and order on motions for summary judgment, Johnson & Johnson v. Guidant
Corp., No. 06-cv-7685 (RJS), 2014 WL 3728598 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2014).
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Guidant $21.5 billion. To make a long story short, once Guidant and
J&J announced their deal, Boston Scientific Corporation (BSC) entered
the bidding and ultimately prevailed with a $27 billion offer. Shortly
thereafter, J&J sued BSC and Guidant, alleging that Guidant breached
its merger agreement with J&J, and seeking expectation damages and
pre-judgment interest in an amount approaching $7 billion.
The most striking thing about the facts of the case is their typicality.
They had
The players were multi-billion dollar corporations.
by
the
cream of
represented
and
were
lawyers
sophisticated in-house
Wall Street law firms: Skadden, Arps, Meagher & Flom LLP;
Shearman & Sterling LLP; and Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP. BSC's
entry into the fray was also typical. Indeed, in deference to the fiduciary
obligations running from corporate management to the shareholders (as
developed under Delaware case law), public company acquisition
agreements almost always provide that the first bidder can get trumped,
with consideration to the original bidder in the form of a substantial, but
not deal-breaking, termination fee. And as is often the case, there were
antitrust concerns arising out of a reduction in the number of players in a
particular market-here, the market for a device known as a drugeluting stent. To understand the litigated issue in context, it helps to
understand the contract provisions commonly used to address these
fiduciary and antitrust questions.
Deal protection devices. When lawyers negotiate contracts for the
purchase and sale of public companies, they walk a line between, on one
hand, the buyer's desire to lock up the deal as against other bidders and,
on the other, the fiduciary obligations incumbent on the target
company's board to obtain the best deal for the shareholders. 7 The trick
is to install as much protection as possible to make competing bids
difficult, but to stop short of making a competing deal impossible. The
typical "deal protection devices" are termination fees, stock and asset
and
purchase options, voting agreements, "force-the-vote" provisions,
8
exclusivity measures like "no-shop" and "no-talk" provisions.

7. There are at least two odd ironies about this tension. First, the buyer's desire to lock out
other bidders cuts against the usual buyer-side incentive to do as much as possible to create an option
rather than a commitment to purchase. In a theoretical sense, these do not conflict as one could indeed
write an agreement that gives multiple "outs" to the buyer yet restricts the seller from soliciting other
bids. But it is generally in the seller's interest to lock down the sale, and the end result is that the best a
buyer gets is a "material adverse change" condition. As the courts narrowly construe them, and it is
possible to draft them to exclude exogenous events, they are not really option creating. Second, the
buyer really does have to believe in the deal because if the deal protection devices work to fend off other
bidders and the buyer acquires the target, it is the buyer (directly or indirectly), that will be bearing the
cost of any fiduciary breach not otherwise covered by insurance.
8. Eleonora Gerasimchuk, Stretchingthe Limits of Deal ProtectionDevices: From Omnicare to
Wachovia, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FN. L. 685, 692 (2010).
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Typical public company acquisition "no-shop" agreements walk this
fine line, and the provisions in the J&J/Guidant contract were no
exception. Section 4.02(a) provided:
[Guidant] shall not, nor shall it authorize or permit any
of its Subsidiaries or any of their respective directors,
officers or employees or any investment banker,
financial advisor, attorney, accountant or other advisor,
agent or representative (collectively, "Representatives")
retained by it or any of its Subsidiaries to, directly or
indirectly through another person, (i) solicit, initiate or
knowingly encourage, or take any other action designed
to, or which could reasonably be expected to, facilitate,
any Takeover Proposal or (ii) enter into, continue or
otherwise participate in any discussions or negotiations
regarding, or furnish to any person any information, or
otherwise cooperate in any way with, any Takeover
Proposal.9
That is an otherwise clear prohibition that would have locked up the
deal for J&J, at least as far as other potential buyers of Guidant were
concerned. But what the foregoing sentence gave, the next one took
away in deference to fiduciary obligations under Delaware law:
[A]t any time prior to obtaining . .

.

Shareholder

Approval [of J&J's takeover proposal], in response to a
bona fide written Takeover Proposal that the Board of
Directors of the Company [Guidant] reasonably
determines (after consultation with outside counsel and a
financial advisor of nationally recognized reputation)
constitutes or is reasonably likely to lead to a Superior
Proposal, and which Takeover Proposal was not solicited
after the date hereof and was made after the date hereof
and did not otherwise result from a breach of this
Section 4.02(a), the Company may . . . furnish
information with respect to the Company and its
Subsidiaries to the person making such Takeover
Proposal (and its Representatives) ....10

In short, the buyer gets the target's commitment to refrain from

9. Johnson & Johnson, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 342. The contract defined a Takeover Proposal as
"the term "Takeover Proposal' means any inquiry, proposalor offer from any person relating to, or
that could reasonablybe expected to lead to, any direct or indirect acquisition orpurchase of... assets
(including equity securities of any Subsidiary of the Company) or businesses that constitute 15% or
more of the revenues, net income or assets of the Company and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole ....
Id. at 343 (emphasis in original).
10. Id.
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looking for another deal, but acknowledges that, as long as the target
doesn't solicit a competing bid, the deal "ain't over till it's over."
Antitrust review. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act
of 1976, as amended," requires a preliminary filing and a waiting
period, based solely on the size of the parties and the size of the
transaction, for every deal of this magnitude, whether or not there are
any concerns that the combination will unduly reduce competition in
any particular relevant market. 12 When there is no concern, the waiting
period lapses, 13 or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) terminates it
early. 14 Where there is concern, the FTC or the Department of Justice
(DOJ) issues a "second request" for documents and extends the waiting
period. 15 Where there is a concern about competition, the FTC or the
DOJ can sue to block the deal (a rare occurrence), 16 or, more often,
to a third party so as to
cause the parties to negotiate a divestiture
17
ameliorate the anti-competitive effect.
With regard to Guidant, everyone in the industry was aware that its
acquisition by either J&J or BSC would eliminate one potential
competitor in the market for a device known as a "drug-eluting stent."
Hence, as it was negotiating the acquisition with Guidant, J&J also was
putting in place an agreement under which it would license the Guidant
technology to Abbott Labs on a non-exclusive basis. 18 BSC had a
similar issue, but had a different contingency plan: it would divest
Guidant's vascular intervention and endovascular businesses, while
retaining shared rights to Guidant's drug-eluting stent program. 19
The issues and the equities. BSC acquired Guidant in early 2006.

Guidant, now owned by BSC, paid J&J a $705 million termination fee.
That fee would have been J&J's exclusive remedy, but for another fairly
standard provision that left in place all applicable legal rights and
remedies if Guidant's breach were "willful."
Again, it is helpful to step back to understand why this provision was
standard in light of the common understanding that an agreement like
the one between J&J and Guidant (a) might well operate merely to put
Guidant in play (albeit without affirmative steps to that end on
11.

15 U.S.C. § 18a.

12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §

16.

Id. § 18(f).

18a(a)(2).
18a(b)(1)(B).
18a(b)(2).
18a(e).

17. How the parties deal contractually with allocating that particular risk is a subject unto itself.
See Stephen Davidoff Solomon, Confronting Antitrust Issues in a Giant Merger, N.Y. TIMES (July 22,
2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/22/dealing-with-antitrust-issues-in-a-giant-merger/?_rO.
18. Johnson & Johnson v. Guidant Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d 336, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
19. Id. at 343.
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Guidant's part), and (b) the presence of the termination fee. The way
these deals work, there can be any number of reasons why the deal does
not close and the termination fee would be J&J's, or any similar
acquirer's, compensation for the lost time and expense. The one thing
that the acquirer cannot abide, however, is that the target simply walks
away from the deal because, for example, incumbent management has
second thoughts and wants to continue to run the company
independently. On the other hand, the typical deal structure expressly
acknowledges that the target indeed may undertake, contrary to the
usual explanation in law and economics for contractual restrictions, a
limited form of the very opportunism contracts are supposed to prevent.
So having collected its termination fee, J&J sued Guidant in
September 2006, claiming that Guidant had breached the acquisition
agreement by providing due diligence materials to Abbott-the party to
whom BSC was going to divest assets. The heart of the alleged breach
was that Abbott did not constitute a "Representative" of BSC under the
contractual definition. Moreover, according to J&J, that the breach was
willful and but for this breach, BSC would not have been able to involve
Abbott and complete the deal. Thus, Guidant proximately caused J&J's
expectation damages under standard contract doctrine.
The case, which survived motions to dismiss and for summary
judgment before proceeding to bench trial before Judge Richard J.
Sullivan of the Southern District of New York, is something of a
lawyer-technician's dream. That is not a term of approbation. Why?
There is barely a single equity running in favor of J&J other than a
technical construction of the definition of the word "Representative"
that gave J&J the opening to throw an argument for "well, you agreed to
it" against the wall and see if it stuck. As Judge Gerald Lynch, who
ruled on the motion to dismiss, observed:
In essence, events followed the sequence anticipated in
the Agreement, and all parties benefited, if not to the
extent they had hoped: the shareholders of Guidant got a
higher price, BSC and Abbott got businesses they
wanted, antitrust problems were avoided, and J&J got
the $705 million it had negotiated as compensation.
Defendants argue that J&J suffered no fundamental
wrong-indeed, that it suffered no harm beyond that for
which the Agreement provided an appropriate negotiated
remedy.
If Abbott and BSC had made a joint bid or had each bid
separately for complementary portions of Guidant,
Guidant would clearly have been entitled to provide due
diligence materials to Abbott. Thus, defendants argue
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that J&J's claim is based on no more than a technicality,
and amounts to a bid to grab more compensation than
the parties expressly provided was 20available. There is
considerable force to that argument.
But the case survived because neither Judge Lynch nor Judge
Sullivan was willing to dismiss out of hand the theory that Guidant
might be liable for many billions of dollars because it indeed provided
due diligence materials to a party that the boilerplate provisions of this
complex agreement did not clearly specify as an intended recipient.
III. A SHORT CRITIQUE OF ECONOMIC AND MORAL CONTRACT THEORY

A. Making It Fit Together
What law professors want to do in the usual economic or moral
theorizing about contract law is to make it all fit together, as though
there is an ideal descriptive or normative regularity to it all. It is what I
have recently begun to refer to as "contract law in the ether." The
metaphor means to evoke that non-existent substance believed as
recently as the early twentieth century to constitute space. 2 ' If you were
a physicist (or, more likely, an inquirer into "natural philosophy") in
1875, you would be up to date if you believed space consisted of an
immovable ether as the substance through which bodies moved. By
1905, when H.A. Lorentz had announced his transformation and
Einstein published his theory of special relativity, you might well have
22
considered theory of ether on the order of a theory of green cheese.
What contract theorists want to do, like scientists making sense of the
physical world by positing the existence of the ether, is to make sense of
contract law by justifying how all the myriad rules of the doctrine fit
together. To do so, they need to posit a world in which there is either no
lexical opportunism (i.e., the subsequent use of language's inherent
imprecision for strategic purposes) or no moral fuzziness (i.e., that
earlier promises were made in language clear enough to impart moral
force upon their breach). But neither of those assumptions holds very
often in the real world.

20. Id. at 344 (emphasis added).
21. "The element once believed to fill all space above the sphere of the moon and compose the
stars and planets." AM. HERITAGE COLL. DICT. 480 (4th ed., 2002); Albert Einstein, Ether and the
Theory of Relativity, in SIDELIGHTS ON RELATIVITY 3-24 (George Barker Jeffery & Wilfrid Parrett,
trans.) (1922).
Biographical,
NOBELPRIZE.ORG,
22. Hendrik
A.
Lorentz
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel prizes/physics/laureates/1902/lorentz-bio.html (last visited Sept. 20,
2015).
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There is, however, nothing new under the sun. Lest it be said that I
am being controversial for controversy's sake, my skeptical review of
contract theory as applied to mergers will be only slightly less scathing
than one issued by a far more eminent scholar than I, Yale Law School
Professor Clyde Summers, who did something similar in 1969 as
applied to collective bargaining. 23 Commenting on the inadequacy of
"ordinary contract law" in dealing with all sorts of complex transactions,
he observed that Arthur Corbin, the authors of the Restatements, and
other treatise compilers simplified their task of making it all fit together
by pushing difficult agreements out of the contract law mainstream and
into other disciplinary pigeon-holes. Hence, Professor Summers asked,
"What is this 'law of contracts' about which treatises and restatements
are written? It almost seems to be the law of left-overs, of
miscellaneous transactions, the rag-tag and bob-tail which do not get
treated elsewhere." 24 Sitting here in 2015, I feel the same way about the
theory as Professor Summers did about the doctrine in 1969.
As I tell my students, the real world is inordinately complex, and it is
not easy to translate our subjective desires into words that even we the
parties, much less an objective third party, understand. We subject
ourselves to the judgment of the community of plain meaning the
moment we open our mouths to order breakfast at a local diner, just as
when we reduce the description of a transfer of a business worth $25
billion from its overwhelming complexity in real life to a mere 100-page
document.25 No academic discipline, even one as mindful of others as
26
the New Institutional Economics, fully captures the process.
Translating my practice intuitions-wakened from their un-dogmatic
slumbers when I encountered the J&J/Guidant case-into academese
leaves me somewhere between economics and semiotics and at some
distance from legal doctrine. Organizing the signs we make to each
other-by way of language or otherwise-into the institution of
23. Clyde W. Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE L.J. 525
(1969).
24. Id.at 565.
25. For an illustration involving the order of "two eggs over easy," see Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The
Bewitchment of Intelligence: Language and Ex Post Illusions of Intention, 78 TEMP. L. REv. 99 (2005)
[hereinafter Lipshaw, Bewitchment].
26. The New Institutional Economics is school of economic thought intended to get beyond the
neoclassical focus on market level variables of price and output (as to which firms were merely
"production factors"). Its proponents sought to theorize about (not just describe) the actual "play of the
game" within firms and institutions. It is central to this discussion, because private ordering through
contracts is one of the key institutions on which their theory depends: economic actors "devise contract
and governance structures that have the purpose and effect of economizing on bounded rationality while
simultaneously safeguarding transactions against the hazards of opportunism."
OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM xiii (1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON,

CAPrALIsM].
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contracts does something to facilitate exchange, but probably not as
much as the theorists would argue.
So I am skeptical about most of the current threads of contract theory
that presume the parties were thoughtful, or even rational, when they set
down the words of the contract over which they actually end up
litigating disputes.27 There is indeed, as legal scholar Nathan Oman
rightly observes, something even in modem and sophisticated contract
practice of the ancient ritual of slaughtering an animal to "cut a
covenant." 28 Yes, we have solemnly committed ourselves to something
in the way of a law-endorsed remedy, albeit less gruesome than being
dismembered like the unfortunate beast. But to what did we commit
ourselves? We have only committed that whatever we do in the future
will not be physically violent, and it is not clear to me even that is the
result of the contract. When it comes to connecting what we did when
we made the contract to what we do when we use the contract as a
weapon (i.e., turn to law to enforce it), I struggle to find jurisprudential
or philosophical rather than semiotic, anthropological, or sociological
significance. Does the institution of contract make cooperation more
likely? Yes, but no more than any other ritual. Does the institution of
contract limit opportunism? Yes, but not in a particularly meaningful
way. The opportunism may be normal, it may be understandable, it may
be venal, it may be silly, it may be vindictive, it may be counterproductive, but it will not be violent. Even that statement imports more
cause-and-effect than I am willing to grant. In other words, contract law
incorporated non-violent remedies when society as a whole was ready to
put limits on violence. We may well sublimate and channel our violent
inclinations into legal claims, but any changes in the law of contract
remedies are an expression, rather than a cause, of some limited
29
progress in civilizing ourselves.
Beyond that there is little to say except that the institution of contract
27. I have taken a shot at this thesis a couple times already, but bear with me, because it's a hard
sell. See, e.g., Lipshaw, Bewitchment, supra note 25; Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Metaphors, Models, and
Meaning in ContractLaw, 116 PENN. ST. L. REv. 987 (2012).
28. Nathan B. Oman, Consent to Retaliation:A Civil Recourse Theory of ContractualLiability,
96 IOWA L. REV. 529 (2011).

29. I am moderately upbeat about whether we, as humans, make progress, notwithstanding
2014's contributions to barbarism like ISIS beheadings or Boku Haram rapes. My friend, the
philosopher Susan Neiman, put it well in the context of a discussion about Hegel's historicism: "The
abolition of slavery, which he didn't live to see, and the demand for gender equality, which he didn't
begin to imagine, can both be read as confirmation of Hegel's claims about freedom .. .And the
abolition of public torture represents progress not belied by all the horrors of twentieth-century history.
Foucault claimed that modem substitutes for torture are subtler forms of domination. But the fact that
we can barely stand to read descriptions of things we would have brought our children to watch a few
centuries earlier marks an advance in human consciousness that seems hard to reverse." SUSAN
NEMAN, EVIL IN MODERN THOUGHT: AN ALTERNATIVE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 99 (2002).
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law checks opportunism or upholds promises only to the extent that ex

post interpretation of those before-the-fact signs remain within the
bounds of the "straight-face test" and the limits of judicial patience.
Professor Summers captured forty-six years ago how little else there was
to say about the internal structure of the institution: "It would seem a
reasonable guess, in fact, that the principles common to the whole range
of contractual transactions are relatively few and of such generality and
competing character that they should not be stated as legal rules at all." 3 °
If specifics of the doctrine itself, the armaments and ammunition law
professors in particular purport to marshal for litigation warriors, have
always seemed a tad tedious to me, perhaps it is because, as Professor
Summers puts it, they are "nothing more than a set of common problems
radiating from centers of tension such as that between subjective and
objective tests of control, between arm's-length and fiduciary relations
of the parties, and between freedom of contract and social control."' 3' In
other words, I have reason to believe both conceptually and empirically
that the system does nothing to check lexical or other doctrinal
opportunism, because most of the issues being litigated have to do with
what the words mean.32
It ought to be obvious that I do not have the same issues with the
sociology-based "law-in-action" school of Stewart Macaulay and others
(and indeed am sympathetic to it), mainly because it eschews the
theoretical justification of the institution or attempts to harmonize its
doctrines. 33 Macaulay and his co-authors are correct that "there are
large gaps between the law school law of contract, what happens in
courts, and what practicing lawyers do[,]" and "contract doctrine clearly
is only one part of what lawyers need to understand to serve their
clients. 34 They rightly warn students against the expectation "that your
professors are going to hand you a beautifully worked out, consistent,

and coherent system called 'contract law.' ' 35 And yes, indeed, contract
law is, instead, "a tool that you can use to try to solve your client's
problems, rather than a set of answers to all your questions."36 What I
am talking about here, however, is the dark side of that last point, in
which the very doctrine Macaulay deflates is the hammer being used to
vanquish the other side, and there are no non-contractual relations
30. Summers, supranote 23, at 568.
31. Id.
32. See generally Preston M. Torbert, A Study of the Risks of Contract Ambiguity, 2 PKU
TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 4 (2014) and sources cited therein.
33. See generally 1 STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION (3d ed. 2010).
34. Id. at 15.
35. Id. at 18.
36. Id.
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moderating the urge to use it. 3 7
In short, the J&J/Guidant litigation that prompted this reflection
seems to be beyond the usual theory that either justifies contract law
(i.e., economics or morality) or minimizes its importance (i.e., non-legal
relations). What checks the use of the linguistic or doctrinal hammer is
the individual desire not to be opportunistic, whether or not there are
long-term relationships, or the desire to be reasonable when nobody
really knows what the terms of the promise were. In the remainder of
this Part III, I offer critiques of economic and moral theories justifying
contract law. In Part IV, I explain what I think is really going on.
B. Checks on Opportunism?

Let us talk about opportunism as a concept informing how we think
about contract law. The thesis here is that as the contracting problem
comes down to cases, as in J&J/Guidant, the only real check on
opportunism is non-opportunistic behavior, whatever its source in
culture, morality, or self-control. How many law professors treat
contract law as a check on opportunism strikes me as a case study in a
kind of theoretical syncretism-an idea with traction at an abstract or
institution level seeps into theories of how real people make real
decisions. Then it becomes part of the disciplinary paradigm and taken
for granted. If, for example, your discipline (and your career within it)
are based on factoring out trust in favor of calculativeness, but trust is a
real phenomenon-originating in peoples' minds and having an effect
even in economic transactions-then somebody familiar with the real
world may look askance at the theory. If your theory puts aside the
possibility of linguistic fuzziness in all but the simplest transactions, and
works its explanatory magic on exchange transactions in which nobody
can argue after the fact (with a straight face at least) that the agreement
was anything other than what everybody would think it was, those of us
who have spent years finding loopholes and twists in the words may be
skeptical about it. People operate culturally under a rule of law, which
means they respect certain limits on being opportunistic outside of
governance and dispute resolutions institutions. To use a sporting
example, it was clearly beyond the pale for the Olympic figure skating
hopeful Tonya Harding to arrange to have a thug take a swing with an
iron bar at her competitor Nancy Kerrigan's knee.3 8 Within an
37. Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business:A PreliminaryStudy, 28
AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963), http://www.jstor.org/stable/2090458?seq=l#pagescan tab contents.
38. Kathy Ehrich Dowd, Nancy Kerrigan Speaks Out About Tonya Harding 20 Years After
Infamous
Scandal,
PEOPLE
(FEB.
23,
2014
4:30
PM),
http://www.people.com/peoplelpackage/article/0,,20778965_20789297,00.html.
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institution, however, it is a game with rules, and the check on
opportunism there is only that with which the player can get away.
Faking a reaction to draw a charging call in basketball may be
opportunistically unsportsmanlike, but it is a generally accepted form of
opportunism. The players regularly test the limits of 39
the adjudicative
system (i.e., the willingness of the referee to call a foul).
While both theory and common sense have long associated contracts
with the limitation of opportunism in non-simultaneous exchange, 4° the
importation of opportunism into law professors' theoretical discussions
began in earnest with the New Institutional Economics (NIE). That
movement's founders, Oliver Williamson and others, were dissatisfied
with how little the classical focus on price and output decisions
explained the origin and function of markets and structures within
them-employment relationship, make or buy decisions, corporate
horizontal and vertical integrations, and so on.4 ' Specifically, "received
microtheory, as useful and powerful as it is for many purposes, operates
at too high a level of abstraction to permit many important
42
microeconomic phenomena to be addressed in an uncontrived way."
To understand economic organization, one needed to understand why
certain transactions were executed across markets and why others were
executed within firms. Were all transactions frictionless, i.e., not
involving costs of execution, neither form of execution would be more
or less efficient than the other. Hence, the NIE focused on transaction
43
costs as the critical determinant of the forms of economic organization.
In turn, every exchange relationship that could be characterized as
one of a contract lent itself to analysis in terms of economizing on (i.e.,
the reduction of) transaction costs. 44 How that happens depends upon
how human beings pursue their self-interest under four key assumptions:
(1) they are boundedly rational; (2) they are opportunistic; (3) they do

39. Along the same lines, "[NASCAR racer] Dale Earnhardt, Jr. explained how drivers push the
rules to the limits. 'We have a rule book, and it's our job or the crew chiefs job to bend that rule as far
as it will go without breaking it."' Dan Patrick, Guest Shots Say What? SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb.
2015, at 22.
40. "Thus the fundamental function of contract law (and recognized as such at least since
Hobbes's day) is to deter people from behaving opportunistically toward their contracting parties, in
order to encourage the optimal timing of economic activity and (the same point) obviate costly selfprotective measures." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 94-95 (6th ed. 2003) (citing
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 70-71 (1914) (1651)).
41. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
IMPLICATIONS 1 (1975) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, MARKETS].

ANTITRUST

42. Id.
43. WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 26, at 17 ("1 submit that the full range of
organizational innovations that mark the development of the economic institutions of capitalism over the
past 150 years warrant reassessment in transaction cost terms.").
44. Id.
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not always operate with the same access to information; (4) they operate
in environments either of uncertainty or such complexity that outcomes
cannot be calculated. Hence, Williamson defined opportunism as "selfinterest seeking with guile,'1 5 involving "'false or empty, that is,
disbelieved, that is, self-disbelieved, threats and promises' in the
46
expectation that individual advantage will thereby be realized.,
Opportunism can be active or passive, and ex ante or ex post. 4 7 Armen
Alchien and Susan Woodward parsed it in more detail. An opportunist
is one who has a conflict between what she wants and what she has
agreed with others, and so will tend to act in her own self-interest to the
extent that it will be costly for the others to know the opportunist's
behavior. 48 Opportunism, moreover, is not just about venality. "It
includes honest disagreements. Even when both parties recognize the
genuine goodwill of the other, different but honest perceptions can lead
to disputes that are costly to resolve." 49 So people do not just contract to
avoid being taken advantage of or hoodwinked; they do it as well so as
to avoid costly disputes "between honest, ethical people who disagree
about what event transpired and what adjustment would have been
agreed to initially had the event been anticipated." 50 Because, in
Williamson's view, "[t]ransactions that are subject to ex post
opportunism will benefit if appropriate safeguards can be devised ex
ante," it might be possible to realign incentives or devise "superior
governance structures" in which to organize transactions. 51 That is
consistent with the general aim of the NIE-to refocus the analysis on
the interplay between markets and firms, rather than merely the
abstractions of price and output. That makes sense even to me, a noneconomist.
My point here is that the NIE's focus on transaction costs brought the
level of economic analysis down from a high level of abstraction to one
relatively more concrete (at least in terms of broad institutional
structures), but the legal focus on the particular aspects of contract
doctrine as actually inhibiting opportunism takes that a step farther.
Professor Juliet Kostritsky contends clearly: "Opportunism is a threat ex
ante to the bargainers' ability (and the ability of other potential
contracting parties) to maximize their gains from trade. Opportunism is

45.

WILLIAMSON, MARKETS, supra note 41, at 26.

46. Id.(citing I. GOFFMAN, STRATEGIC INTERACTION 105 (1969)).
47.

WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 26, at 47.

48. Armen A. Alchien & Susan Woodward, The Firm is Dead;Long Live the Firm:A Review of
Oliver E. Williamson's The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, 26 J. ECON. LIT. 65, 66 (1988).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.at48-49.
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the enemy5 2of bargains and of efforts to achieve the maximum benefit of
bargains."
That is the move I question. The usual justification for contract law
in NIE is that it curtails the "holdup" problem, but the thought
experiments demonstrating that effect are generally so simple and so
divorced from problems of interpretation as not to reflect the disputes of
the real world. The contracting relationship between J&J and Guidant
was typical, but it did very little to inhibit J&J's willingness or ability to
be opportunistic. In other words, when opportunism can be lexical,
what limits being opportunistic is not the existence of a contract, but the
inclination not to be opportunistic. Indeed, the mark of a good lawyer is
the ability to make a case out of any real world textual glitch in the same
way that an opportunistic baseball pitcher can use the slightest
imperfection (like a scuff mark) in a ball to his advantage.54
The leap from economic to legal theory of contract, however, is more
problematic. Williamson observed an unhelpful division between
economists "preoccupied with the economic benefits that accrue to
specialization and exchange" and lawyers (I am assuming primarily
academic ones) who "focus on the technicalities of contract law.",5' And
he approved of the legion of law and economics scholars who sought to
close the divide.56 In 1985, he identified, on one hand, "the problem of
trying to theorize contract law as between the "fiction of pure legal
centralism" (i.e., the idea that courts routinely resolve contract issues on
the basis of the terms of the contract) and, on the other, the equally
fictitious idea that parties cannot or do not turn to third parties to resolve
their relational disputes. 7 Indeed, trying to theorize about contracts,
like the contract between J&J and Guidant, that were neither simple and
52. Juliet P. Kostritsky, Plain Meaning vs. Broad Interpretation:How the Risk of Opportunism
Defeats a UnitaryDefault Rulefor Interpretation, 96 KY. L.J. 43, 46 (2007).
53. Alchien and Woodward observed that Williamson had not distinguished between two
different forms of opportunism, the holdup problem, on one hand, and moral hazard, on the other.
"Holdup" is where the value of one party's assets or resources depends on their association with those of
another, and the other could expropriate rents without some er ante protection. "Moral hazard," on the
other hand, arises when one party relies on the behavior of another, and it is costly to get information
regarding that behavior. This is best understood in the context of agency costs. For example,
shareholders want managers to act in the best interest of the company. But it is costly for shareholders
to know what managers are doing. So a manager might well be tempted to act in his own interest.
Alchien & Woodward, supra note 48, at 67-69.
54. The following from another long-time practitioner comports precisely with my experience:
"When the unanticipated event brings significant economic benefit or detriment to a party, it has an
incentive to review the contract, find ambiguities, and develop self-serving interpretations." Torbert,
supra note 32, at 5.
55. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVER.NA.,CE121
WILLI-mSON, GOVERNAi'CE].

(1996) [hereinafter

56. Id. at 122-23; WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 26, at 397-401.
57.

WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supranote 26, at 399.
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discrete or long-term and relational--"the middle range," as he put itwere "notoriously intractable., 58 And Williamson adopted a binary
approach to transaction cost contracting that excluded the middle: one
mode is characterized by careful, detailed,
and thoughtful planning; the
59
document.
incomplete"
"very
a
other by
Thirty years later, the problem of the intractable agreement, both
complex and, in the economic jargon, "incomplete," still exists. The
problem is the intractability of language, something the economic theory
recognizes but cannot reduce to a graph. Transaction cost economics
take as fundamental that contracts are as boundedly rational as the
humans who write them. What makes them incomplete is that almost no
contract of any complexity can anticipate all of the "state contingencies"
of the future. So it is the economically inclined law professors who
have tried to bring the problem of opportunism down to cases by way of
theoretical approaches to interpretation, prominently among them Juliet
Kostritsky, Richard Posner, Eric Posner, and the co-authors Alan
Schwartz and Robert Scott. 60 For example, some have suggested that
the appropriate way to resolve interpretation issues is to determine
which view maximizes the joint surplus of the transaction; as Judge
Posner puts it: "Each party, it is true, is interested in just his own profit,
and not in the joint profit; but the larger the joint profit is, the bigger the
"take" of each party is likely to be." 6 1 My issue with these theorists is
not necessarily the use of economic logic to guide courts in resolving
disputes, even if I still do not fully understand how courts would
determine such a hypothetical joint surplus. Rather, I question the
connection to the ex post check on opportunism the contract was
supposed to provide.
The problem is that the analysis assumes there was something in the
use of language capable of algorithmic precision in the first instance.
When it comes down to cases, there is still tenuous linkage between
what humans are capable of writing down in language ex ante and how
that language bears up in the ex post dispute. Hence, for the economist,
contract language is largely irrelevant. Williamson's summary is
instructive.
Transaction cost economics take account of Karl
Llewellyn's description of "contract as framework," that is, something
58. Id. at 399.
59. Id. at 20.
60. See, e.g., Kostritsky, supra note 52; Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract
Interpretation,83 Tax. L. REV. 1581 (2005); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After
Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE U. 829, 839-42 (2003); Alan Schwartz & Robert E.
Scott, ContractTheory and the Limits of ContractLaw, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003).
61. POSNER, supranote 40, at 96; see also Kostritsky, supra note 52, at 45 ("This paper presents
an analytical framework for choosing an interpretive methodology that can curb opportunism and
implement the parties' goals to maximize joint gains.").
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that "almost never accurately describes real working relations, but...
affords rough indication around which such relations vary, an occasional
guide in case of doubt, and a norm of ultimate appeal when the relations
cease in fact to work., 62 In other words, the main action in contract is
"ex post governance." 63
The metaphor of contract as framework or, as I prefer, model or map,
is insightful. Economic theory attempts to reduce our attempts at
linguistic reduction to something like scientific precision, and then finds
itself disappointed when the theory provides no predictive power at all.
Do refinements in contract language lead to a more accurate model of
reality and thus fewer instances of litigation? I doubt there is a
falsifiable design of experiment for the proposition.
C. Upholdingthe Sanctity of Promise?
And did we make promises we are morally bound to keep? Perhaps,
but only if the promise is so lexically clear as to have us absolutely sure
about what we promised. Indeed, I am not, and never have been, a
skeptic about moral agency. I am a skeptic about the extent to which
any justification or explanation of the institution of contract law, its
constituent doctrines and rules, or its practice map in any way on the act
of deciding what is the right thing to do when deciding whether to call
someone on a promise or to fulfill one. Once again, the theoretical
discussion loses its impact as we move from high-level abstractions to
cases like J&J/Guidant.
I admire Charles Fried's Contract as Promise and his later reflection
64
on it.
He wrote the book in 1981 as reaction to schools of thought that
saw contract law as merely another form of social organization, and
which views minimized or eliminated the role of contract law as the
state's affirmation of classically liberal values like respect for persons,
trust, and living up to the autonomous individual's freely assumed word.
On re-reading the original volume, I now see that even though he never
dug into the problem of lexical opportunism, he recognized its reality.
His treatment of interpretation evokes the bizarre Raffles circumstance,
in which "interpretation may fail to locate a core of agreement, and so at
some point we must admit that the contract gives out." 65 But in cases
like J&J/Guidant, the parties indisputably have a contract but also seem
62.

WILLIAMSON, GOVERNANCE, supra note 55, at 10 (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price

Contract?An Essay in Perspective,40 YALE L.J. 704, 737 (1931)).
63. Id.
64.

CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION

(1981); Charles Fried, Contract as Promise Thirty Years On, 45 SUFFOLK L. REv. 961 (2012).
65. FRIED, supra note 64, at 89. See also the discussion of Raffles, supra note 5.
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not to have a core of agreement on the very words to which they agreed.
Professor Fried appears to have agreed with me: the only real check on
opportunism is the willingness not to be opportunistic. When we look to
resolve the dispute, we look not just to law but also to values like
"sharing and altruism." 66 Hence, Professor Fried observed:
If drastic consequences hang the balance for one or the
other party and we are reaching the edges of the actual
agreement (and who says the boundary must always be a
sharp one - the formalists, whoever they may be),
inevitably there will be pressure to avoid pushing
language and one's contractual partner to the wall. This
is the principle of civility, which permits the smooth
functioning not only of private but of civil institutions:
Dubious advantages are not pressed to their limit, lest
the willingness to cooperate be undermined and the
necessary limitations of language and goodwill be
overreached. 67
What is the J&J/Guidant case if not one in which drastic
circumstances hang in the balance for one of the parties, and indeed the
other has pressed a dubious advantage to its limit?
The problem with the moral "promise-affirming" justification of
contract law is the same as that encountered with the economic models:
it depends on the assumption that the parties' ex ante agreement was
clear enough to have moral force in the resolution of the case at hand.
Fried's appeal to civility rather than law as the only real check on
opportunism was ironically similar to one of the theories Fried himself
sought to counter: Ian Macneil's relational contract theory.68 In 1974,
Macneil had proposed a schema of polarities as between "transactional"
and "relational" contracts, one of which was "Commencement and
Termination." A transactional contract at the extreme, say a one-time
agreement for the future purchase of wheat (and hence subject to the
parties' opportunism if the market price were to vary from the contract
price), would have the attribute of being "[s]harp in by clear agreement;
sharp out by clear performance." 69 A relational contract at the extreme,
on the other hand, would have far more gradual beginnings and endings.
My experience in the business world is that Macneil was correct in
identifying putatively contractual relationships in which the nature of
the relationship often supersedes anything written in the contract. But
there is nevertheless a universe of agreements, like the one in
66.
67.
68.
69.

FRIED, supranote 64, at 89.
Id. at 89-90.
Id. at 3, n.7.
Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contract, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 691,738 (1974).
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J&J/Guidant, which are neither transactional nor relational at the
extreme of Macneil's model. In those, the agreement is neither sharp in
by clear agreement, sharp out by clear performance, nor generally
capable of having disputes resolved in the context of long-term
relationships. As another long-term practitioner has observed, the
primary problem in the performance of those putatively incomplete
contracts is70not "gap-filling," but ambiguity of the very language of the
agreement.

We need therefore to come to terms with how lawyers manipulate
words and sentences, not in "Dick and Jane" contracts, but in the
mapping of complex one-time transactions.
IV. THOUGHTS IN A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE VEIN

A. What is Really Happening?
So far, the most thorough study of the language of these complex but

non-relational agreements is the fascinating history, empirical work, and
theoretical speculation of Mitu Gulati and Robert Scott regarding the
persistence of a problematic clause in scores of sovereign debt
agreements. 7 1 The great value of their work is that it helps dispel the

theoretical myth that the language bears a calculated relationship to "the
promise." I suspect the history they recount of the automaton-like
inclusion of contract language is spot on, particularly in complex yet
relatively uniform deals like bond issuances, and it is close to my own
experience in those kinds of deals. Additionally, their account of how
the clause continues to appear in those agreements strikes me as typical
70. Torbert, supra note 32, at 5.
71. Mrru GULATI & ROBERT Scor, THE THREE AND A HALF MInUTE TRANSACMTON:
BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACr DESIGN (2013).
72. For a short time, my law firm asked me to be the underwriter's counsel in a number of
"conduit" municipal or economic development bond financings. In these transactions, private
businesses avail themselves of the proceeds of government-issued bonds. The municipality or state
agency actually issues the bonds, but they are backed by a letter of credit issued by a commercial bank
in favor of the trustee, and the bank, in turn, has a reimbursement agreement with the company that will
receive the proceeds of the financing. As in typical firm underwritings, the underwriter agrees to buy up
the bonds at closing, but, in the meantime, it has marketed the bonds to its customers. The documents,
which include a loan agreement, a trust indenture, an underwriting agreement, and a prospectus, while
customized to some extent from deal to deal, are very much boilerplate. The following lawyers attend
"document meetings" in which they routinely flip through hundreds of pages of largely unchanged
verbiage: the borrowing company's counsel, bond counsel (who putatively represents the bond trustee
and the bondholder), underwriter's counsel, and bank counsel.
One of the other partners in our firm-who by this point was an antitrust litigator--told me the story of
how as a young associate he had been assigned to a bond deal, and traveled to New York for a document
meeting with a trust indenture he had drafted from scratch, all to the great amusement of the experienced
bond lawyers at the meeting.
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of the way clauses like the definition of "Representative" in the

J&J/Guidant agreement also appear.73
The inspiration for the Gulati-Scott work is the fact that two highly

publicized court cases demonstrated a significant interpretation problem
in sovereign debt contracts with something known as the pari passu

clause. Sovereign debt practitioners acknowledge that the insertion of
the clause in their contracts does not make any sense. The two cases

made it clear that creditors might use the nonsensical clause
opportunistically to their advantage. Nevertheless, the clause continues
to appear in sovereign debt agreements. 74 What I find less puzzling than
Professors Gulati and Scott is the apparent irrationality of a gap between
practice and "the theoretical models of how sophisticated contract
drafters behaved and with the dynamic model of case law serving as the
basis for contract drafting and innovation." 75 I admit that the question of

the pari passu clause in sovereign debt agreement is puzzling, but I also
suspect Gulati and Scott-who are inclined to theorize in economic
models that begin, and in some cases, end in rational calculation-have
not fully credited rigorous, but less quantifiable, theories that explain the
practitioners' own explanation of the phenomenon as the result 76of
"rituals, talismans, alchemy, the search for the Holy Grail, and Zeus."

I am less concerned here about how the language originally arises
than what the parties do with it later. From my standpoint, the key
observation from Professor Gulati and Scott is this: "Where some saw
the pari passu clause as a mere relic or mere surplusage resulting from

earlier drafting errors, Elliott [the creditor suing to take advantage of the
pari passu provision] saw opportunity.,

77

That strikes me as precisely

what J&J did with the "Representative" language in the lawsuit against
Guidant. Indeed, there may be norms within the sovereign debt

73. As John Coates testified at the J&J/Guidant trial, the "topping bid" provisions like those in
the J&J/Guidant deal, including the definition of "Representative," are considerably less standard, but
my early and unsystematic review of subsequent deals suggests that the J&J/Guidant litigation has not
significantly impacted drafting practices as to these provisions.
74. GULATI & ScoTr, supra note 1, at 11-17. The documents they studied are loan agreements
between creditors and sovereign governments. The par!passu provision, providing equal distribution
standing for creditors so designated, makes no sense when the debtor is a sovereign that can never be
liquidated, and therefore the creditors will never be faced with an issue of relative preferences in
distribution. Compare this to corporate financing, in which tranches of debt or equity may have
preferences to each other, in which tranches the creditors are in pari passu, and which status may be
altered within or among the tranches by contract.
75. GuLATI & ScoTr, supra note 71, at 5.
76. Id. By comparison, see Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Beetles, Frogs, and Lawyers: The Scientific
Demarcation Problem in the Gilson Theory of Value Creation, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 139 (2009)
(arguing that economic models of behavior do not deserve privileged theoretical status over other
disciplines).
77. GULATI & ScoTr, supra note 71, at 15.
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community that tended to inhibit opportunism not otherwise present in
one-off instances of lexical opportunism. Professors Gulati and Scott
noted that it took the vulture funds, the "pariahs" of the sovereign debt
industry, to press the expansive interpretation ofparipassu. "Almost all
of our respondents agreed that Elliott had acted opportunistically,
pushing an78 interpretation of the clause that few believed to be
plausible."
Though the particular canons of construction may have differed in
J&J/Guidant, the aim was the same: use the contract language as it
existed, regardless of its source, to press an opportunistic advantage.
And the cases had similar results: both settled. In the pari passu case,
"Elliott realized a very nice return on its long-shot litigation and walked
away with more than $58 million on bonds that it had purchased on the
secondary market for around $11 million. 79 BSC/Guidant paid J&J
$600 million, less than ten percent of the total value of the possible
outcome. 80 Whether the settlements were windfalls, I suspect, lies in the
eye of the beholder. It strikes me as significant, however, that Elliott's
windfall, the result of a "pariah's" opportunism, "outraged many (and
caused envy in others).'
What is important to me is that the after-the-fact opportunism of
seizing upon text for financial or strategic advantage, one instance of
which Gulati and Scott ably describe, is the rule, not the exception. It
happens because our very use of language is a kind of unthinking
boilerplate that only snaps into focus when we have to analyze it rather
than use it. That is the subject of the next section.
B. A Language Theory Approach to ContractLanguage

Consider a reflection from the physicist, biologist, and philosopher
Jacob Bronowski about the relationship of theory and confirmation in
the physical sciences:
We are here face to face with the crucial paradox of
knowledge. Year by year we devise more precise
instruments with which to observe nature with more
fineness. And when we look at the observations, we are
discomfited to see that they are still fuzzy, and we feel
that they are as uncertain as ever. We seem to be
running after a goal which lurches away from us to

78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.at 157.
Id.at 16.
Boston Scientific, supra note 2.
GULATI & Scorr,supra note 71, at 157.
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82
infinity every time we come within sight of it.
Contract theory, whether economic or moral, depends on precisely the
opposite conceit, namely that by closer crafting of language we can
better achieve correspondence between the document and the reality. It
takes criticism of the very semantics of those theories to understand why
language is, and always will be, the gift that keeps giving, at least in
terms of being an opportunistic tool.
Let's return to the J&J/Guidant agreement.
It defines
"Representatives" as either party's respective "directors, officers or
employees or any investment banker, financial advisor, attorney,
accountant or other advisor, agent or representative." The issue was
whether Abbott, as BSC's candidate for purchase of the divested assets,
constituted a "Representative" of BSC under this definition, and hence
qualified to receive the due diligence material. We can stipulate that the
language does not so provide expressly. Hence, the parties were obliged
to argue that they did or did not actually intend the language to cover
Abbott (the "implied in fact" argument) or that the conventional use of
the language meant that Abbott was or was not covered (the "implied in
law" argument"). We can further stipulate that there was no parol or
interpretive evidence as to any objectively manifested agreement as to
the meaning other than the contract language itself. So the dispute boils
down to whether the contractual statement defining a representative was
true when applied to Abbott.
Resolving theoretical perplexity about contract language means
disabusing ourselves, as contract lawyers and law professors, that any
expression in language, whether in conversation or in text
(constitutional, statutory, regulatory, or contractual), is always a
calculated correspondence to an individual intention, much less a shared
one. Indeed, contract lawyers do engage in granular wordsmithing, but
that is not how people normally communicate with each other. I want to
make three points to help us understand why lexical opportunism
abounds. The first is about the conventional objectivity of language,
even when we, as speakers, think it is highly personal and subjective.
The second has to do with the conversational or textual context in which
language gets used. The third has to do with the extent to our sentences
in language, including those in a contract, are true in the sense of
corresponding to the reality they purport to represent.
Objectivity of language. The most famous discussion on this point is
what has come to be known as Wittgenstein's "private language"
argument:
[A] language in principle unintelligible to anyone but its

82.

J. BRONOWSKI, THE ASCENT OF MAN 356 (1973).
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originating user is impossible. The reason for this is that
such a so-called language would, necessarily, be
unintelligible to its supposed originator too, for he would
83
be unable to establish meanings for its putative signs.
Although I do not refer to Wittgenstein in class (for fear of losing my
students even more than I normally do), this is basis for my initial
discussion of the plain meaning doctrine in contract law. That is, not
just contract language, but any language is quasi-public commitment,
regardless of the individual subjective sensation to which the speaker
believes the language corresponds. The minute we use words, we take
the risk of there being a gap between our subjective desires and the
language we use to describe them. I use the following example with my
contract law students. I go into a restaurant and say, "I want some
guacamole." My wanting guacamole is a subjective desire. But I did
not make up the word guacamole. That word is a tool I pull off the
linguistic shelf (as it were) because it suffices to map on what I think I
want. But, I tell my students, it turns out that I do not just want
guacamole. Putting guacamole in my mouth evokes a particular
sensation that is my private and subjective experience of guacamole.
Nothing quite tastes and feels like guacamole. I could describe it to
them, but when I do, the language I use, as opposed to the sensation, is
not private to me.
How do I describe what I want out of the guacamole other than by
language? It is not to say that all private and subjective experience is
shared and objective, but there is no way to describe the subjective
experience except in a language that is objective. To put it differently, if
we are using language to describe our most personal sensations, we are
still "objectifying" those sensations. None of us invented the word
"guacamole." It has a public and objective meaning in the same way
"500 railroad cars full of watermelons" 84 has a public and objective
meaning. If I just use the word "guacamole," I take the risk that what I
get is not really what I want. To me, the word that describes what I
want is-and this always gets a big laugh--"guacamolity." The
problem, of course, is that nobody else in the world understands what
that evokes-just the right texture, spice, color, etc. Moreover, even
that invented word has a certain semantic objectivity to it, because when
83. LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 244-271 (G. E. M.
Anscombe, trans., 3d ed. 1967); Stewart Candlish & George Wrisley, Private Language, in STANFTORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY ARCHIVE (Fall 2014).

84. TKO Equipment Co. v. C & G Coal Co., Inc., 863 F.2d 541, 545 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Under
the prevailing will theory of contract, parties, like Humpty Dumpty, may use words as they please. If
they wish the symbols 'one Caterpillar D9G tractor' to mean '500 railroad cars full of watermelons',
that's fine - provided parties share this weird meaning.").
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I say guacamolity I actually have invoked objective community word
usages that would let somebody else figure out the meaning. When we
add "-ity" to a word in English we know without thinking that we are
creating a noun that describes a property. Specificity is the property of
being specific. Particularity is the property of being particular.
Guacamolity is the property of being like guacamole.
But even though I have made some progress in conveying to them the
property of being like guacamole, I still have not managed to come up
with words to describe my completely subjective sensation. So what I
need to do is find more objective words off the linguistic shelf that can
get me closer to expressing what it is I really want. So I describe my
experience when my wife and I used to take her grandmother out to
dinner. She was no philosopher of language, but she did understand
how to turn subjective desires into objective language. "Now the fish,
it's not too dry?" "And butter, I can't digest butter." "How much salt?"
"Haddock. Is that fishy tasting?"
The reality is that the most of our words, phrases, and sentences have
a conventional meaning most of the time, and so we do not take much of
a risk that we will be misunderstood in our ordinary conversation or
transactions. But my point for nascent contract lawyers is that the
process of using the objective medium of language doesn't just start
when we begin translating our inter-subjective "let's do something
together" into a sales agreement, a lease, or plan of merger in a twobillion-dollar deal. It actually starts the instant we begin translating our
subjective desires into an objective medium, because the world just does
not understand the contractual equivalent of terms like "guacamolity."
The same is true when lawyers translate from thought to paper as they
write customized sentences. Some of it gets parsed granularly, but the
writing manages to flow at all because so much of it is still
conventional.
Words and sentences acquire their objectivity by way of their
conventionality. They are objective because people understand them in
a conventional way. To return to Wittgenstein, words have no inherent
meaning. They are symbols. They become useful symbols because they
are so widely understood. A green light does not inherently mean, "go."
It is a convention, albeit an extremely powerful one. It permits us to say
objectively that a green light at an intersection means, "go." Even
simple words take on meaning because we have a shared community
understanding of them. Wittgenstein refers to this in his notes on the
difference between use and reflection in the choice of words.8 5 To
demonstrate this in class I make the following statement: "I am your
85. WrrrGENSTEIN, supranote 83, at §§ 59-70.
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teacher." I then ask the students if they understand the word "teacher"
in the context of me? All do. But do any of them actually apply
"teacher" to me in a calculated or reflective process? Certainly, the
native English speakers do not. The reason, per Wittgenstein, is that we
regularly use words in context that have the effect of applying them to
things or circumstances because it just makes sense in a way that we
may not be able to define.
I then utter another sentence. "I am your moreh." Only students who
know Hebrew will know that I have merely used the word for a male
teacher. Once I explain it, all the students understand it, but it is a
matter of conscious reflection. They learn the word, translate the word,
and apply the word. One final example of the power of convention is
the process of crossing a street if you are an American in Great Britain.
You no longer look for cars; if you want to survive, you have to
interpret which way to look. If you are an American, and you step into
the street, you expect a car to becoming from your left. It is almost
impossible not to look left. And if you look left, a car coming up from
the right, which is the way it works in Britain, will hit you. And, again
to get a laugh, I project a picture of the technique the British use to
address the problem: "Look Left" and "Look Right" painted in the
crosswalk next to the curb.
To summarize the first point, the words and sentences of the contract
are objective phenomena at the time of the litigation, and there is no
reason not to be opportunistic in their interpretation.
Language in context. The second point in unpacking the inherent
opportunism has to do with context. The seminal work here is that of
philosopher of language Paul Grice who theorizes that there is
considerably more to the exchange of meaning between speakers and
listeners than a collection of conventional and objective meanings to sets
86 Here, Grice's contribution is implicature in
of words and sentences. 86
conversation, the idea that merely referring to the conventional
meanings of words will not fully capture the meaning being
communicated between speaker and listener. 87 Grice asserts that there
are certain conditions or protocols that exist in ordinary talk exchanges,
which he calls the Cooperative Principle. The four categories and
related maxims of the Cooperative Principle are:
* Quantity: Make one's contribution to the conversation as
informative as necessary, but no more informative than necessary.
* Quality: Do not say what one believes is false or for which one
lacks adequate evidence.
86.

PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS (1991).

87.

Id. at 24.
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*

Relation: Be relevant.
Manner: Avoid obscurity and ambiguity and be brief and
orderly.8 8
Among the most notable applications of Grice's theory of meaning to
legal texts has been the work of Professors
Lawrence Solum and John
89
interpretation.
constitutional
Mikhail in
I have no desire to wade into debates about constitutional texts.
Indeed, what I find most insightful about Grice and contract texts is the
very distinction between a conversation and a document, a point made
by Professor Deborah Hellman in her respectful critique of the Mikhail
piece. 90 If we are constrained by the "meeting of the minds" metaphor
in thinking about contracts, there might well be more traction in
applying Gricean conversational maxims to contractual language. What
Gricean analysis does here is underscore that a complex contract
document being litigated long after its creation is not a conversation at
all.
The key is that a conversation occurs in real time, and the
interlocutors can react immediately to violations of the Cooperative
Principle. Here are two transactional examples. In the first one, I walk
into an ice cream shop and order an ice cream cone. The person behind
the counter says "would you like waffle or cake?" I respond, "I don't
want a waffle or a cake. If I wanted a waffle, I'd go to IHOP. If I
wanted a cake, I'd go to Rosie's Bakery. I want an ice cream cone." I
have violated the Relation maxim in that I have applied otherwise
conventionally understood meanings of "waffle" and "cake"
inappropriately in the context of this conversation. The person behind
the counter corrects the problem immediately: "Oh, you misunderstood.
We serve ice cream in cones. They are either waffle cones or cake
cones." And in turn I immediately become aware of my conversational
error, and the issue is resolved.
The second example is one of conversational error creating humor. In
Fiddler on the Roof,9 1 Tevye the dairyman is going to negotiate a
contract with the old rich butcher Lazar Wolf. Tevye thinks he is
negotiating a sale of his milk cow; Lazar thinks he is negotiating a
contract of marriage to Tevye's oldest daughter. Hence, it is funny
*

88. Id. at 26-27.
89. Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Texting, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 123 (2007); John
Mikhail, The Constitution and the Philosophy of Language: Entailment, Implicature, and Implied
Powers, 101 VA. L. REv. 1063 (2015).
90. Deborah Hellman, Unintended Implications, 101 VA. L. REv. 1105, 1106-07 (2015) ("First,
a constitution is not a conversation between its drafters and some other people and, as a result, it is
unclear whether the Gricean paradigm has anything useful to say about constitutional interpretation.").
91.

JOSEPH STEIN ET AL., FIDDLER ON THE ROOF: BASED ON SHOLOM ALEICHEM'S STORIES

(2004).
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when Lazar says "you have a few more without her" and Tevye replies
that today he wants one, but tomorrow he may want two, or that Lazar
tells Tevye the deal is important because Lazar is lonely. The difference
between a litigated case and this one is that Tevye and Lazar Wolf
figured it out before the fact, and did not somehow manage to write a
contract in which it was still possible that one was referring to a
daughter and one to a milk cow.
In short, when we are disputing contract interpretation well after the
fact, and particularly when there is no parol evidence to support one
interpretation or the other, all we can do is construct narratives of
hypothetical conversations within contexts that support our desired
interpretations. Indeed, more often than not, the same problems exist in
contractual interpretation that Professor Hellman identified with respect
to the Constitution: the purposes of the drafters may not have been
obvious, it may not be clear that they intended to cooperate with later
readers, and they may have "deliberately adopted language that was
compromise and that avoided
ambiguous or obscure, which reflected
92
decisions about controversial issues."

The philosopher Max Black reflected on precisely this aspect of the
conventionality and context of spoken versus written language.93 While
we can choose our words carefully (as lawyers sometimes, but not
always, do), words are capable of being conveyors of their own
meaning. 94 The key is the transition from speech as evanescent sound
signals to written script. 95 Textual interpretation becomes a matter of
speculative theory about what the speaker was thinking or the speaker's
motives rather than "the articulated expression of thought." 96 Put
otherwise, the dominant metaphor is of language as a map of the
thought. Black's criticism is that trying to reconstruct the thought rather
than to focus on the conventional and contextual meaning of the map is
an exercise in futility. 97 My point is that argument from text is what
contract litigation is all about; trying to theorize about contracts as
though there is an underlying and discoverable shared thought apart
from its articulated expression, especially in the absence of parol
evidence, is equally futile. 98
92. Hellman, supra note 90, at 1106-07.
93. MAX BLACK, THE LABYRINTH OF LANGUAGE 46 (1968).
94. Id. at 69.
95. Id. at 60.
96. Id. at 57.
97. Id.
98. Larry Solum has made a similar point in the context of constitutions, statutes, regulations,
and ordinances, but the point applies equally to the text of a negotiated contract. When more than one
individual creates a shared text, it has, in his coinage, artificial meaning, i.e., a meaning that is
something other than the natural meaning we would impute to speech uttered by a natural person.
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Language and correspondent truth. The third point about lexical

opportunism comes from a particular aspect of philosophy of language
known as correspondence theory.
Since Aristotle and Plato,
philosophers have been asking about the extent to which language, a
uniquely human capability, maps on a reality that is independent of
those using it to communicate. The issue is how to assess the truth of
our thoughts, belief, propositions, and judgments. 99 In the simplest
terms, what makes these "truth-bearers"-"public language sentences,
sentences of the language of thought (sentential mental representations),
and propositions"-true (or truer) is that they match (or match better)
some portion of reality (often called the "truth-makers"). 100 My
criticism of contract theory reflects philosopher J.L. Austin's more
general objection to the "isomorphism" brand of correspondence. That
is, isomorphic correspondence theory looks for a one-to-one relationship
between the truth-bearing statements and the truth-making facts, and the
degree of naYvetd of the isomorphism has to the do with extent the
theorist is committed to "assigning corresponding objects to each and
every wrinkle of our verbal or mental utterings."'' 1 The idea of a
complete contract, particularly as the economists use it, strikes me as
naYve isomorphism. In other words, we will always have an incomplete
correspondence between contractual language and the reality of the
transaction, but our goal as lawyers is to create contracts that are
linguistic truth-bearers having an increasingly precise relationship to a
certain state of affairs. Like Austin, I think this aspiration of
correspondence, when taken to an extreme, goes too far. It "projects the
structure of our language into the world." 102 Contracts can indeed be
coherent maps of a present or future state of the world, but I agree with
Austin that a contract, like any statement, "as a whole is correlated to a
state of affairs by arbitrary linguistic
conventions without mirroring the
' 10 3
inner structure of its correlate."
Legal interpretation is (usually) the parsing of artificial meanings. Grasping these
meanings is not a matter of inferring the mental states of a particular individual or
group of individuals. When it comes to group agents, mental states play a role in
the production of artificial meanings, but the meanings themselves cannot be
reduced to those mental states.
Lawrence B. Solum, ArtificialMeaning, 89 WASH. L. REv. 69, 84 (2014). The meaning of a contractual
text is just as "artificial." Even if the language "mapped" a thought, there is no shared thought to map.
99. See generally GERALD VISION, VERITAS: THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY AND ITS CRITICS
(2004).
100. Marian David, The Correspondence Theory of Truth, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY ARCHIVE (rev. July 2, 2009), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall20l3/ entries/truthcorrespondence/.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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This is why trying to ground theoretical truths about contract lawwhether economic or moral-is so hard. The difficulty arises because of
the gap between theories of knowledge (i.e., what the contract is trying
to reflect-in correspondence theory, the truth-makers) and theories of
language and meaning (i.e., the limitations of the statements that
constitute the contract-in correspondence theory, the truth-bearers).
To formulate economic justifications (restraining opportunism) or moral
justifications (affirming promises) of contract, the theorist is obliged to
assume away any gap between the theories of knowledge and meaning.
In other words, for the theorist, the propositions correspond precisely to
the state of reality.
Contract statements are often elliptical in the sense that economy of
expression is at a premium (one of Grice Cooperative Principles). 10 4
Thus, a contract might say, for example:
(C)
Seller to deliver 10,000 bushels of wheat, and
Buyer to pay $5.00 per bushel in cash upon delivery.
Delivery to be completed before 12/31/15.
Statement (C) is a slightly more austere way of saying "The parties
agree that Seller is legally obliged to deliver 10,000 bushels of wheat,
the Buyer is legally obliged to pay $5.00 per bushel in cash upon
delivery, and the delivery must be completed before 12/31/15." If so,
then a correspondence theorist could say that (C) is true if and only if
the parties agreed that Seller was legally obliged to deliver 10,000
bushels of wheat, the Buyer was legally obliged to pay $5.00 per bushel
in cash upon delivery, and the delivery was to be completed before
12/31/15. Similarly, the claim of correspondence, call it (D), for the
definition of "Representative" in the J&J/Guidant contract would be:
(D)
"The contractual clause 'Representative' is any
director, officer or employee or any investment banker,
financial advisor, attorney, accountant or other advisor,
agent or representative" is true if and only if the parties
to the contract agreed that Representative is defined as
director, officer or employee or any investment banker,
financial advisor, attorney, accountant or other advisor,
agent or representative.
The definition in the contract is true because it matches something
that really happened, namely that the parties made an agreement in
reality that matches the commonly understood meaning of the
contractual statement.
Here then is my j'accuse to contract theorists of almost all stripes:
104. 1 am indebted to my colleague, Pat Shin, who came up with this way of formulating
proposition.
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you are correspondence theorists, and naYve ones at that, when you
claim that the impact of (D) in a contract is to constrain economic
opportunism or carry moral force. That the contract truth-bearer
corresponds to the truth-maker (i.e., the underlying transaction) is only a
valid assumption if the transactions and their corresponding language
are so simple (i.e., "Dick and Jane") that nobody would disagree about
the application of the language, something belied by the fact that there is
a colorable dispute.
Indeed, the na've correspondence in contract theory has real problems
at both ends of the correspondence. At one end, what is the reality to
which the contract language is supposed to correspond? This takes a bit
of translation from otherwise confusing terminology that philosophers
use. If you believe that propositions in language must correspond to an
independent reality to be true, you are deemed a "realist." On the other
hand, if you believe, for example, that propositions in language can have
meaning and be "true" as a result of their coherence apart from
correspondence to an independent reality, you are deemed an "antirealist. Philosopher Gerald Vision observes, however, that assessing
correspondence theory requires addressing another issue, namely, what
is the nature of the independent reality to which the propositions
correspond? 10 5 As to that independent reality, can something beyond
our empirical observations be "real?" If you believe it can, you are now
deemed a metaphysical realist. What this all means is that if you believe
there is a reality independent of your own mind, your theory of what
makes a statement about it true ought to account for such a reality. Put
otherwise, correspondence theory is only about the relationship of the
proposition to the reality, and makes no claims about what the
corresponding reality is. It does not account for a belief, for example,
that the Easter Bunny, phlogiston, or God is real.
Consider this in the context of contract language when there is no
parol evidence to be found. If the only evidence of the agreement is the
contract language, but the language is a map of a transaction, what is the
reality of the transaction to which the language corresponds? Alan
Schwartz and Robert Scott are among the most sophisticated articulators
of economic theory applied to contract interpretation. They have argued
that most sophisticated business people would prefer a formal rather
than a contextual approach to interpretation of the contract language; in
other words, they are arguing that business people prefer the reality of
the transaction to be nothing more than the language used to map it. As
they note, "If the parties agree on the language in which their contract
was written, the court's interpretive task is limited to finding what the

105.

VISION, supra note 99, at x.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

31

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 5

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 84

parties intended that language to say."' 10 6 Therein lies the circularity and
paradox of formalism and "mutual intention."
Even the most
sophisticated of contract formalists, contending that the agreement is
nothing more than the contractual language, want correspondence
between the propositions embodied in the contract, on one hand, and
"what the parties intended that language to say," on the other. To me,
under the assumptions I have imposed (i.e., the only evidence of what
the parties intended the language
to say is the language itself), the reality
07
is as elusive as phlogiston.'
On one end of the correspondence between language and transaction,
then, we have no idea what the transaction was, precisely because the
language was the only evidence the transaction occurred. The problem
with naive correspondence on the other end of the correspondence is the
limitless ambiguity of the language itself, particularly in its application
to circumstances arising long after the use of the language. Professor
Bayless Manning captured this in his "law of the conservation of
ambiguity":
Elaboration in drafting does not result in reduced
ambiguity. Each elaboration introduced to meet one
problem of interpretation imports with it new problems
of interpretation. Replacing one bundle of legal words
with another bundle of legal words does not extinguish
debate; it only shifts the terms in which the debate is
conducted. 108
I have conceded the possibility that a transaction is so simple that
there is no credible argument over the conventional language used to
map the transaction. To return to contract statement (C) regarding the
delivery of wheat, assume there is no other parol or contextual
interpretive evidence. In theory, this contract should protect against the
seller's opportunism if the market price of wheat rises to $8.00 a bushel,
and the buyer's opportunism if the market price falls to $2.00 a bushel.
In fact, what happens is that the market price drops, Seller tenders the
wheat, and Buyer says, "Oh, you have tendered hard winter red wheat,
and our deal was for hard spring red wheat." Whatever the resolution of
this particular dispute, the drafter of the next contract clarifies it,
specifying that the wheat to be delivered is hard winter white wheat.
106. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 60, at 570..
107. Vision puts it nicely: "At best, such reality would acquire the status of a Kantian
noumenon." VISION, supra note 99, at xi.
108. Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis and the Law of Conservation of Ambiguity: Thoughts on
Section 385, 36 TAx L. 9, 21 (1982); see also Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71
Nw. U. L. REv. 767 (1977); Andrew Stumpff, The Law is a Fractal: The Attempt to Anticipate
Everything,44 LOYOLA U. CHI. L. J. 649 (2013).
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Indeed, that is the closest to a Gricean conversation we are likely to get
with respect to the text itself.
This is naYve correspondence, because, as it turns out, both the reality
to be mapped and the language of the mapping it are elusive even in the
simplest of cases. There is another way to make sense of what is going
on, and it is consistent with Dennis Patterson's persuasive thesis about
what makes
any legal proposition, not just one embodied in a contract,
"true.' 10 9 In Law & Truth, Patterson characterized all but one of the
prevailing "modernist" views of law and truth as "nam[ing] a relation
between an asserted proposition and some state of affairs that makes the
proposition true." 110 Patterson adopts what he calls a post-modernist
view. What makes a legal proposition true
is not that it is true if it names a relation between a
proposition and some state of affairs but that it is true if
a competent legal actor could justify its assertion. Doing
this requires the speaker to employ the forms of legal
argument. In short, "true" is a term of commendation or
endorsement.' 11
I find myself surprised to be adopting any view that goes by the
adjective "post-modem," but Patterson's articulation of the philosophy
underpinning of his more general view of the truth of legal propositions
resonates for this critique of contract theory. He observes, "Languageits powers, its secrets-is a central preoccupation of contemporary
philosophy." ' 1 2 Hence, the post-modem view disputes the notion that
propositions in language correspond and are therefore true in relation to
the state of the world. "[P]ost-modemist conceptions of the word-world
relation see the modernist picture of propositional, relational truth as
unintelligible; a project that never gets off the ground.""' 3 The key is
the very language of promises, the legal enforcement of which
economic and moral theories seek to justify. The post-modem view
(ironically now having been articulated for well over a half-century)
"breaks down the
distinction between explanation and the phenomenon
' 14
to be explained." "
The idea of language "corresponding" with something
outside language can never be cashed out because all
talk of language is still use of language: no part of
109.

DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW & TRuTH (1996).

110. Id. at 151. To be clear, in Patterson's view, the relation need not be to an empirically
verifiable fact,
and so coherence and other theories of truth fall into this category.
111. Id.at152.
112. Id.at160.
113. Id.at160-61.
114. Id.at162.
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language can be tom apart from the whole and valorized
as a "metalanguage," a superlanguage or "language
about language."" 5
When we get beyond general theory and down to specific cases, the
economic and moral justifications of the institution of contract law go
out the window. The only thing that makes sense of what the lawyers
are doing is a particular application of Patterson's more general thesis
about legal propositions. Put aside the notion of "truth." The postmodem view of legal propositions focuses on "practice, warranted
assertability, and pragmatism.""1 6 What makes legal propositions
meaningful is the way lawyers use them in practice. In particular, as
Patterson points out, "[t]he essence of law is legal argument: the forms
of legal argument are the culturally endorsed modes for showing the
truth of propositions of law." 117 In cases like J&J/Guidant, it consists of
how lawyers use legal propositions in the interpretation of texts, such as
contracts). Like all argumentation, the exercise is to "convince someone
of something by appealing to beliefs he already holds and by combining
these to induce further beliefs in him, step by step, until the belief we
wanted finally to inculcate in him is inculcated." ' 1 8 What makes the
assertion of legal propositions "true" in contract cases is not their
doctrinal coherence or their purported correspondence to a state of
affairs, but that a lawyer successfully has shown how the text and the
states of affairs, beginning before the parties ever communicated and
culminating in the present
dispute, "'hang[] together' with everything
' 19
else we take to be true."
It is fair to say nobody litigating the J&J/Guidant case would ever be
able to demonstrate that it was true or not true, in a correspondence
sense, "Representative" did or did not include the candidate for
divestiture of assets. What each party undertook was a narrative meant
to persuade a third party that its view of the text, combined with all the
other circumstances, hung together. Contract language, at least in any
case in which there is a colorable dispute, is capable of meaning derived
not from correspondence to objectively verifiable fact, but from mental,
or social, or conventional constructs. Hence, we are all able to be
115. Id. at 162.
116. Id.at 161.
117. Id. at 181.
118. Id.at 172 (quoting W.V. QuINE & J.S.
ULLIAN, THE WEB OF BELIEF 86 (1970)).
119. Id. at 159. For a similar view, see Maribel NarvAez Mora, Expressing Norms: On NormFormulationsand Other Entities in Legal Theory, 25 REvus J. CONST. THEORY & PHIL. OF L. 43, 46
(2015) ("It makes no sense to assert the ontological character of norms. What is advocated can be seen
as a metaphysical position - a grammatical or conceptual standpoint, depending on the philosophical
map in which it is inserted. It is not a true thesis about a material world nor about a world of abstract
objects, but a rule of representation, an expression of sense, or a philosophical statement.").
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lexical opportunists, making arguments from the text that imperfectly
maps on reality. We do so by constructing post hoc but conceivable
narratives about hypothetical conversations (in the Gricean sense) that
would put our self-promoting interpretations in context. And this
largely eviscerates the economic and moral justifications of contract
law. Contracts do not inhibit opportunism, and they do not affirm moral
promises except when the language is so simple that nobody can contest
its meaning.
A fortiori, in circumstances like J&J/Guidant, inhibition of economic
opportunism and moral affirmation of promise keeping cannot account
for what is going on. Lexical opportunism, the making of the
interpretive argument, is the entire game.
V. CONCLUSION

I learned from a wise boss along the way, however, not to tolerate
something constructive
unless
about problems
complaining
accompanied the complaint. So I will conclude in that vein. There is a
tension here between (a) on one hand, our seemingly innate teleologyan adaptive inclination to believe there is order, and even human-like
intention, in the chaos-that works its way into the "science" of contract
law (as it does the science of everything else), and (b) on the other hand,
our obligation as theoreticians of an applied social science, as educators
of professional problem-solvers, and as practicing lawyers to be
reflective about whether our particular theory helps those for whom we
use our skills. Just recently, a participant on the Kauffman Foundation's
entrepreneurship list-serv asked whether anybody could recommend
reading on the problem of "over-lawyering." 120 I responded that the
issue is a significantly tough nut because effectively it means teaching
students not to use precisely the tools we just spent all that time teaching

them. 121
Dealing with over-lawyering means teaching and learning selfreflection to the effect, "[t]here's more to the world than my particular
take on it, and I need in this moment to defer to that." Yet we have to
do so in the face of the predominant impact of behavioral economics on
contract theory-suggesting all contracts are "incomplete" but holding
out the ideal of one that is complete (i.e., anticipates all future statecontingencies). As the perplexity of Gulati and Scott demonstrates,
120. E-mail from Patience A. Crowder, Assistant Professor of Law & Director, Community
Economic Development Clinic, University of Denver Sturm College of Law to Kauffman's EshipLaw
list, (Feb. 2, 2015 20:06 EST) (on file with author).
121. E-mail from Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School, to
Kauffman's EshipLaw list (Feb. 3, 2015, 10:01 EST) (on file with author).
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there is a real hindsight bias at work in theory, because at the time of the
dispute we know that the language was not precise enough to avoid the
problem-that it failed to cut off all of the conceivable conversational
implicatures and left enough for the lexical opportunist to use as
ammunition.
But I also wonder about the practical aspect of the reduction of
document to text. No, a contract is not a conversation, but at least in
these complex transactions (as opposed to the boilerplate in my Best
Buy receipt or the click-through on my order from L.L. Bean) there was
some conversation that preceded the document. The lawyers work to
eliminate (or cancel in Gricean jargon) 122 as many inappropriate
implicatures as possible, but indeed they recognize that eliminating them
all would be an impossible if not endless task. The contract is a backup
plan, created in anticipation of a later conversation about the deal.
Litigation like Elliott or Johnson & Johnson v. Guidant over an outlying
interpretation arises from the serendipitous availability of sufficiently
arguable language and the willingness to let one's opportunistic
inclinations overcome what others would have taken to be the
conversational context. And perhaps the concept of implicature is a
theoretical response to the puzzlement of Gulati and Scott to what they
perceive as "obvious failures to correct errors in the formulation of
historic boilerplate., 123 If we think of the evolution of contract
provisions as a kind of meta-conversation, perhaps the participants
simply do not believe this particular error is worth the effort to cancel
the erroneous implicature.
In any event, my purpose here has not been to resolve the perplexing
question of sticky but odd contract provisions. Rather, it has been to
consider the limits of particular disciplinary theories when applied to a
complex and interdisciplinary world. Do these academic theories, here
of contract law, matter? They certainly do if you are an academic
theoretician. But translating theory to practice and employing theory in
the real world requires reflection on the desire to impose our own
theoretical constructs onto our clients and their problems and learning
how to step back from that.12 4

122. Mikhail, supranote 89, at 1074-75.
123. GULATI & SCOTT, supranote 71, at 6.
124. See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, "hat's Going On? The Psychoanalysis Metaphorfor Educating
Lawyer-Counselors,45 CONN. L. REv. 1355 (2013).
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